Schindler is asking in the work, "Did Vatican II signal accomodation to liberal political institutions and liberal philosophical presuppositions after a century and a half of opposition?" This is a great difference historically between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism. While Protestants quickly accomodated to liberal thought and institutions, Roman Catholicism recognized profound theological differences between the Christian tradition and the liberal tradition. Unfortunately, this led Roman Catholicism to support authoritarian regimes who used their coercive power to empower the life of the church. Schindler argues correctly that Vatican II completely renounced such use of coercive power by the church. Ironically, it now is conservative evangelical Protestants who seek to associate with right wing regimes to use the state's authority to pursue their theological and moral agendas -- it has replaced pre-Vatican II Roman Catholic in undertaking such agendas.

Does this mean that the Church is completely at home in liberal societies? Schindler argues "no!" and does so by a careful analysis of the concept of freedom. Schindler argues that "liberalism cannot so easily claim the moral authority of Catholicism, and, at the same time, to indicate why an increasing liberal hegemony throughout the world should be viewed not altogether with favor but, on the contrary, with a certain alarm" (p. 32), His argument is that "the achievements of liberalism are in fact mediated by an ideology. . . . Liberalism invites us to adopt only its freedom and its institutions while (putatively) permitting us to supply our own theories which will give meaning to freedom and free institutions; but liberalism does so -- paradoxically -- all the while hiding the very theory (of liberalism) which alone justifies this (purported) extrinsic relation between freedom institution and theory. In fact, this very extrinsic relation, which is taken to guarantee a supposedly 'empty freedom,' already embodies a definite, though hidden, conception of human nature and destiny" (pp. 33-34). Thus liberalism "draws us into a con game, inviting us to dialogue within the (putatively) open and pluralistic market of religions, all thewhile having, hiddenly, filled the terms of that dialogue with a liberal theory of religion" (p. 44).

We are free to practice our religion as long as our religion fits the definitions given to us by the liberal categories. We find this all the time in Mid-City, especially in working with the poor and immigrants, where the state that ensures "our freedom of religion" wants to regulate who and how we distribute goods and care for the poor and the stranger. As Schindler, like Zizek argues, "the liberal appeal to religious pluralism hides its own 'monism'; the liberal appeal to religious freedom hides its own definite truth about the nature of religion" (p. 44) -- simply, that "religion" is about private belief and therefore bears no rationality nor 'truth'. Religion is an inner fact of consciousness, not an external means of bodily action that rightly disposes us to God, as it was so understood by Aquinas.

Thus "freedom" takes on a "purely formal" definition (p. 66) that restricts actual freedom. As Schindler argues, "Either the juridical claim that it implies positive openness to God; or the juridical definition does carry the implication of positive openness to God, in which case it does not remain purely formal" (p. 66). Schindler sees the same dynamics within liberalism as Zizek (and independent of him), dynamics that hurt Christians who support a state that works with a strictly formal definitions of freedom, a notion that really does deny actual freedom as Zizek argues. Those who are most "unfree" are actually those who believe that they are most free by adopting a liberal, formal notion of freedom that does not allow one to see the authorities that really shape one's life. As Schindler argues, "Failure to be clear about this implies nothing less than the paradox of imparting a truth about freedom unconsciously and blindly -- and just so far unfreely:" (. 67).

What this means is that a genuine concept of freedom cannot bracket a concept of truth -- by definition. Like Ragu pasta sauce, truth is already "in there" when one speaks freedom. Some concept of truth is already embedded whenever freedom is announced -- whether it be the truth that is Jesus Christ or the truth that is the authority of the state. We cannot, nor do we really want to, disassociate an understanding of "freedom from" from a positive notion of freedom as a "freedom for."

Is this a call for a return of a totalitarian state? Of course not. It is a recognition, however, that we already live in a totalitarian state -- ask the poor. Ask Marcos Rodriguez who was ticketed this fall for falling asleep at a picnic table in Balboa park. Ask Dave and Bob who have their goods stolen from them by CalTrans and receive tickets early in the morning for littering because they do not have funds to get into housing. Ask the Center City Community Development Corporation if you can start a place for a church in the new development in downtown San Diego in order to welcome the poor into San Diego. It is a recognition that speaking and acting out of a "religious pluralism" or as "people of faith" is not pluralistic at all because it takes away our freedom for confessing that God really is Father, Son, and Spirit; Lover, Beloved, and Love, eternally so.

This is why we have to keep with direct action by being freed by liberal understandings of freedom so that we might live for the freedom of the Gospels, a freedom of love of God manifested in personal engagement in the works of mercy. It is why we must hearily embrace the most important, basic freedom from is not formal at all, but a freedom from sin, the freedom of Mary to say, "Let it be, Lord, as you wish."

It is fascinating how John Paul II speaks like one from within the Wesleyan-Holiness tradition in the "Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation". As Schindler summarizes, "the ethical dimension of the task of liberation presupposes, and must be integrated within, liberation 'in its primary meaning, which is salvific' (n. 99) -- and which is thus a matter of redemption from sin by Jesus Christ (n. 99). Indeed, slavery to sin is the deepest root of all other forms of slavery in the cultural, economic, social, and political spheres (ICATL, Introduction). This sin is always primarily personal in nature, but in a derived sesne it is also applicable to structures (ICFL, n. 75). Liberation from slavery to sin takes the positive form of a path toward lolve; hence it entails working 'for the conversion of hearts and for the improvement of structures' (ICFL, n. 75), in short, for a 'civilization of love' (ICFL, n. 99). ICATL summarizes thus by saying, with Paul VI and John Paul II, that any authentic theology of liberation will rest upon the three pillars of 'truth about Jesus Christ, truth about the church, and truth about mankind' (V, 8)" (p. 90). Thus, "the Gospel call to the perfect love that constitutes holiness remains in place, however much the concrete working out of that love must be further developed in terms of the different concrete circumstances of one's life and culture" (p. 92).

Here is the difference between Zizek and the faith given to the saints. Zizek ultimately falls back beyond his criticism of liberal notions of freedom to the Real behind the real as the excremental, that which is left over. For Schindler, and the church, real freedom is found in the God who is Love, eternally so, who calls us to participate in God as Love in loving God and thus neighbor, who gives us ultimately a reason for a freedom for, rather than merely criticizing a freedom from. Perhaps this is why Zizek argues that one has to pass through Christianity today in order to see possibilities other than the "new world order of a freedom from" violently imposed upon the peoples of the earth to direct local goods towards global markets for the profits of a few. Yet one wonders why one would pass through the gospels without allowing oneself to be freed for the God who so loved the world that God gave the only-begotten Son, that whoever believes in Him should not perish but have ever lasting life?